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SUMMARY

	GENERAL
1.4.	British see remaining Korean differences relatively inconsequential (page 3).
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Vi.	Britain warns subjects to leave Egypt (page 4).
	WESTERN EUROPE
19.	Adenauer-Mayer talks on Saar appear unproductive (page 5). French Foreign Affairs Committee strongly influenced by Churchill's speech (page 5).
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	GENERAL	
1.	British see remaining Korean differences relatively inconsequential:	
25X1A	The British Foreign Office considers that the principal objective in the Korean truce negotiations must be to reach an armistice quickly. In relation to this aim the details of present ment's attitude is that the ultimate disposition of prisoners of war is of "little world consequence," as long as the principle of non-forcible repatriation is maintained.	
	Prime Minister Churchill is now taking a close personal interest in the armistice negotiations.	
	The American Embassy in London believes the British desire for an early armistice in Korea is largely due to Churchill's desire to keep "relatively unimportant questions" from hindering the arrangement of a personal meeting with Malenkov.	
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	- 3 - 25X1A	

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	NEAD HACE A FIDICA	
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA	
4.		
25X1A	The British ambassador in Cairo has warned all British subjects to leave Egypt, making clear that those who remain do so on their own responsibility. No change, however, has	
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No reinforcements of the Suez base are presently contemplated beyond the approximately 2,000 commandos who left Malta on 12 May.

Egyptian clashes Britain had refrained from issuing such a warning to its nationals in Egypt. Despite British plans to remain in the Suez Canal zone, London has evidently become dubious of its ability to exercise sufficient military control in the delta area to effect the evacuation of the 27,000 British civilians estimated to be in Egypt.

WESTERN EUROPE

5.	Adenauer-Mayer talks on Saar appear unproductive:
25X1A	After two of his scheduled three talks with French Premier Mayer and Foreign Minister Bidault, Chancellor Adenauer told Ambassador Draper that they showed no willingness to compromise on the Saar issue despite taking what he considered an encouraging attitude on EDC as a whole.
	Comment: Adenauer had indicated earlier in the spring that talks with Mayer were his chief hope for reaching an understanding on the Saar issue. Mayer had made such an understanding a prerequisite for French EDC ratification.
	Domestic political considerations in West Germany will probably prevent any significant new attempt at a Saar settlement until after the September German elections.
6.	French Foreign Affairs Committee strongly influenced by Churchill's speech:
25X1A	Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Edgar Faure told American officials in Paris that Churchill's speech had completely changed - 5 -
	25X1A

his group's attitude toward four-power talks and made outright rejection impossible. He made this statement by way of comment on the French National Assembly's motion of 13 May urging the government to present a concrete proposal for four-power talks at the earliest possible date.

According to Faure, the motion was designed to prevent Foreign Minister Bidault or anyone else from precipitating negotiations without adequate preparation. It represents a compromise between committee members unconditionally favoring four-power talks and others who, while not opposing them, wish to see maximum safeguards established.

Comment: The French Foreign Ministry is reported to consider Churchill's speech untimely in view of indications at Panmunjom and elsewhere that Soviet policy is substantially unchanged.

-6-

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